I. INTRODUCTION
Some of the most important work of appellate courts consists of drawing, or refusing to draw, categorical distinctions. Consider any two legal categories. We may be able to distinguish them if they are both merely present together in a case, or even if they interweave with one another but retain their separate identities, the way fudge might be swirled through vanilla ice cream while remaining distinguishable. Despite the swirling, the fudge and the vanilla would still be recognizable. The harder cases, though, involve the complete and inseparable blending of two legal categories.
In the free speech area, the Supreme Court has confronted these difficulties in seeking, where possible, to disentangle commercial speech from noncommercial speech. 1 The Court has also expressed greater 2 or lesser 3 reluctance to distinguish between one person's vulgarity and another's lyric. 4 A distinction between "amusement" speech and
The analysis in Brown raises a number of secondary issues, including whether any additional kind of speech could ever join the few speech categories, such as fighting words, already deemed unprotected under the Free Speech Clause. 10 For our purposes, though, the crucial focus of the opinion and this Article is on the relationship between political speech and entertainment speech.
The crucial passage from Justice Scalia's opinion runs as follows:
[V]ideo games qualify for First Amendment protection. The Free Speech Clause exists principally to protect discourse on public matters, but we have long recognized that it is difficult to distinguish politics from entertainment, and dangerous to try. "Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine." 11 Justice Scalia thus sees the problem as more severe than carefully detangling, where possible, the two intertwined strands of political speech and entertainment speech. The detangling task is instead generally not to be attempted. At the very best, Justice Scalia seems to be saying that distinctions between entertainment and political speech will typically be subjective or riskily unclear and, in that sense, arbitrary and not reasonably justified. On this basis, the violent video game statute in Brown was then subjected to a highly demanding strict scrutiny test. . . an average of more than 7½ hours a day, seven days a week" with various media, not even including some popular media uses).
To the extent that the unamended statute excluded violent video game play online, on smartphones, et cetera, that would presumably both reduce any possible positive effects of the statute and perhaps also reduce the overall free speech burden of the statute.
10. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733-34. There is much to be said about any historical closing of the door, forever, on any new categories of unprotected speech. How the Court can divine at this point that no possible future combination of culture and technology could ever generate a form of speech not meriting free speech protection, or too riskily granted such protection, has thus far been left unclear by the Court.
11. For an intriguing judicial change of heart on the wisdom and viability of drawing a somewhat similar distinction between speech that addresses matters of public or merely private concern, see infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
12. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738-42.
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This Article puts in a broader legal and cultural context and critically evaluates Justice Scalia's reluctance to distinguish politics from entertainment or, more precisely, political speech from entertainment speech. 13 Some may think of Justice Scalia's reluctance as the embodiment of judicial modesty or realistic practical wisdom. Others may think of it as an unnecessary expression of relativism or subjectivism that is ominous in its implications. Either way, whether we can appropriately distinguish between entertainment speech and political speech, and then apply appropriately different free speech standards in each case, says much about our status and priorities as a culture. Placing pure nonpolitical entertainment or amusement at the very core of the Free Speech Clause should certainly be controversial. As it turns out, if we decide that most or all entertainment speech is indistinguishable from political speech, we must then realistically expect other categories of speech to be treated as practically indistinguishable from political speech as well. And all of this may well be inconsistent with our scheme of broadly liberal democratic values.
We initially assume below merely that Justice Scalia's approach and the resulting rigorous application of strict scrutiny are at least debatable on the merits. After all, the California statute appeared to focus on a narrow class of exceptionally violent video games, 14 vaguely akin in some respects to constitutionally obscene materials. 15 Traditional obscene materials, we might note, must lack judicially determined serious value when taken as a whole. 16 But such obscene materials need not be shown, through unequivocal empirical social science evidence, to distinctively cause some serious identifiable social harm or demonstrably undermine some compelling government interest. 17 And the California statute, again, did not attempt to deny the video games in question even to minors where a parent was involved 18 or where sale or rental could be bypassed.
19
Certainly, the general moral quality of traditional forms of obscenity is controversial. But so is the moral quality of the particular narrow class of exceptionally violent and judicially nonvalued video games regulated in Brown. It is possible to object to either or both of these kinds of speech as immoral or even as unworthy of the most stringent free speech protection even in the absence of a rigorous demonstration of serious social harm.
In fact, one can quote Justice Scalia himself from a prior case to suggest the ability to debate his approach in Brown. Consider the approach taken by Justice Scalia in the context of public nude dancing as erotically expressive speech:
The traditional power of government to foster good morals (bonos mores), and the acceptability of the traditional judgment (if Erie wishes to endorse it) that nude public dancing itself is immoral, have not been repealed by the First Amendment. 20 This is not to suggest inconsistency on the part of Justice Scalia. Perhaps one could say that nude dancing before consenting adults in a club setting is contrary to enforceable public morals but that the transactions with minors regulated in Brown are not.
Our initial aim is, again, not to immediately endorse or take issue with Justice Scalia's approach in Brown. We instead initially assume merely that his approach was either generally well-chosen or not. That much seems uncontroversial enough. The question we first consider focuses instead on how a society could gain enough perspective on itselfenough critical self-awareness-to evaluate the overall merits of Justice Scalia's approach. On the basis of a broader cultural perspective, the substantial risks and costs of Justice Scalia's approach eventually become clearer.
The discussion below assumes that a legal culture and its surrounding broader culture do not always make their constitutional mistakes entirely at random. Consider, by loose analogy, that a cowardly or rash individual person tends, more than others, to act cowardly or rashly. 21 22 we can easily imagine that cultures with particular characteristic defects or excesses tend over time to exhibit those defects or excesses disproportionately, even in judicial decisionmaking.
The point, stated in the broadest fashion, is this: to the extent that we are aware of our culture's systematic defects and excesses, that critical self-awareness may promote better constitutional decisions or at least allow us to recognize the especially likely nature of our systematic or characteristic constitutional mistakes.
As it turns out, the categories most widely discussed by historians, philosophers, and cultural critics that most assist us in this regard are three in number. As the first very general category, used herein merely as a baseline, a legal and surrounding culture might be referred to simply as "civilized."
23 Second, a culture that seems in some important particular respect to be in overall decline can, to that extent, be thought of as "late" or "decadent."
24 Third, and finally, a culture might, in some respects, depart from both pure civilization and "lateness" in ways that can reasonably be thought of as crudely uncivilized or even "barbaric."
25
Once these categories are fleshed out to anyone's satisfaction, that person may then decide on the extent to which the above categories, or some mixture thereof, describe our own contemporary legal or broader culture. On that basis, we may gain some important additional perspective on the correspondingly likely nature of our culture's systematic constitutional mistakes.
Our basic assumption in this regard was articulated by the great novelist Thomas Mann in this way: "A human being lives out not only his personal life as an individual, but also, consciously or subconsciously, The hope, in particular, is that each reader's judgments in this regard will further inform that reader's response to Justice Scalia's approach in Brown, in which it is deemed generally too difficult and too dangerous to attempt to distinguish political speech from entertainment speech, with even the latter thus receiving equally rigorous strict scrutiny protection. 27 The costs of this approach in general are explored in the conclusion.
Below, the Article first briefly reviews some of the related entertainment speech case law. 28 Once this judicial background is in place, the idea of a culture that is thought to be "late stage," in decline, or decadent is then taken up as usefully as possible. 29 An account of the idea of the uncivilized or barbaric, as set off against the idea of civilization, is then briefly referred to, drawing upon the work of historians, philosophers, and cultural critics. 30 The conclusion recognizes that even clear cultural tendencies, trends, biases, or patterns cannot reliably explain individual cases such as Brown. 31 The conclusion instead seeks to bring all of the above strands together and provide a broad vantage point and perspective for critiquing the merits of Justice Scalia's crucial logic in Brown. 32 The conclusion offers implications, however, that extend far beyond the context of merely the Brown decision itself. has posed a number of apparently difficult challenges for the Supreme Court.
II. THE FREE SPEECH LAW CONTEXT

42
Speech in the form of the expressive or symbolic conduct involved in commercial nude dancing is apparently protected by the First Amendment in rather standard ways. Regulation of such speech on the basis of its content or assumed viewpoint would apparently evoke the rigorous standard of strict scrutiny, 43 requiring, at least, the clear advancement of a compelling governmental interest by narrowly tailored means. 44 Regulating such speech on something like a content-neutral basis, however, evokes only some form of mid-level scrutiny. 45 The Supreme Court has explicitly declared that the standard sorts of commercial expressive nude dancing do not lie at the heart of the First Amendment as central free speech cases. Thus, the plurality opinion in the Barnes case determined that "nude dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so." Judicial Line-Drawing SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW subject to some lesser standard of constitutional protection. 49 Such speech is not to be thought of as generally second-class speech on the constitutional scale. Rather, the idea is apparently that expressive commercial nude dancing somehow barely makes it over the boundary line into generally fully protected status.
Finally, a sampling of the relatively few violent video game free speech cases prior to Brown rounds out the constitutional context of Justice Scalia's opinion in Brown. The speech regulations in these cases vary, but the typical legislative focus has been on somehow limiting juvenile access to the most graphically violent video games, where the game in question was deemed to lack serious literary, artistic, scientific, or, importantly, political value for minors.
50 The typical such regulation, then, did not seek to regulate any video game judicially determined to have serious political value for minors. 51 This constitutionally based judicial determination clearly bears on Justice Scalia's doubts as to the reasonable distinguishability of entertainment speech from political speech.
It is also worth noting the literalist but telling point that a number, though certainly not all, of the violent video game cases involve regulated corporate parties whose very names, voluntarily chosen, include terms such as entertainment or amusement. 52 This of course does not establish that violent video games in general aim at entertainment or amusement to the exclusion of politics or that entertainment speech can always be separated from political speech. But it suggests something of the typical, basic self-understanding, intentions, and priorities of the regulated corporate parties. 52. See cases cited supra note 50.
The first of the major pre-Brown violent video game case opinions to consider is American Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick, 53 authored by Judge Richard Posner. As it happens, the regulation in Kendrick appeared to be limited to a particular class of "amusement machines." 54 If it had been the case that the regulated parties intended to convey, or could reasonably be interpreted to have conveyed, any sort of political message, it is not clear that those machines would even be considered mere amusement machines within the literal scope of the regulation.
It might even have been arguable that a machine intended both to convey a political message, however vaguely, 55 and to amuse the player should not be legally reduced to the category of amusement machines. 56 The regulated parties in Kendrick, however, could have understandably thought of themselves as engaged in amusement or entertainment speech, as separate and distinct, in their case, from political speech. The basic distinction between entertainment speech and political speech seems, in Kendrick's context, to be reasonably manageable. In any event, the ordinance at issue in Kendrick regulated access by minors to public video game machines and was further limited to not just amusement machines but rather those machines appealing to a minor's "morbid interest in violence" and featuring "graphic violence" as further specified by the ordinance. 57 Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, the ordinance by its terms excluded from its coverage any video game found to be of "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value as a whole" for minors. 58 This language by itself can hardly prove the reasonable distinguishability, in typical cases, of entertainment or amusement speech and political speech. But the obvious inference from the regulatory language and the typical obscenity case opinions is that some entertainment speech will also involve significant political content, some entertainment speech will not, and the courts will commonly be able to reasonably draw this distinction as a matter of law. This is certainly not to deny that there will unavoidably be borderline cases 59 or that entertainment speech and political speech may indeed delicately interlace. But even in such cases, the entertainment and the politics may still be separable, or at least distinguishable, in principle.
The crucial question, following Justice Scalia, is ultimately whether any influence, including culturally late subjectivism, relativism, prudence, judicial humility, a sense of fallibility, or even nihilism, should lead us to largely abandon all attempts to distinguish entertainment from politics, in this context and far more generally, and then to abandon as well other familiar distinctions between political speech and other forms of speech. The practical implications of our realistically abandoning such distinctions among speech categories would, as we shall conclude, be substantial and generally unappealing.
Moreover, Judge Posner in Kendrick does draw a distinction between the possible harms of speech and the possible offensiveness of speech.
60
The video game ordinance was thought to be based largely on purported harms, 61 whereas traditionally, obscenity has been prohibited based largely on its adjudicated offensiveness 62 to community norms. 63 In Kendrick, Judge Posner found, at least at the preliminary injunction stage, no "compelling" evidentiary grounds sufficient to justify the regulation. 64 59. We can imagine, unfortunately, torture video games to be judged by some as essentially "entertainment" speech, by others as essentially "political" speech, of whatever quality, and by still others as perhaps "hate speech." And it would admittedly be possible to argue both that all forms of torture are always wrong and that only minimal harm results from the repeated play, by minors, of realistic interactive torture video games. This might depend on the minor's familiarity, desensitization, habit, social and other environmental influences, age, duration, general mental health, and idea compartmentalization.
60 We should, at this point, emphasize that the focus of Justice Scalia's (non)distinction is between political speech in particular and entertainment or amusement speech. Neither Justice Scalia nor this Article addresses the constitutional value of, say, scientific speech 74 or the judicial ability to distinguish scientific speech from either political speech or entertainment speech, assuming that the latter categories can themselves be distinguished. We can thus set aside a number of further complications.
It is in the end certainly possible, for some purposes and on some definitions, to say that every video game, violent or otherwise, involves an ideology, 75 or even a political ideology, however hazy or unintended and nonparticularized. 76 For some purposes, perhaps everything we say has political implications, whether intended, likely grasped, or not.
77
But if every video game, violent or otherwise, is held for free speech purposes to embody a political message and involve political speech, we have then for most important purposes gone too far, and we will inevitably pay too high a price in terms of our basic Or we could ask in addition, if all video game speech is relevantly political, why most, if not all, workplace or school-based verbal sexual harassment speech is not at least equally politically ideological. Why would not strict scrutiny of all content-based regulations of such harassing speech be called for? 83 And again, why would not nearly all pornography and obscenity count as political-ideological speech and thus be protected by strict scrutiny when regulated on the basis of its content or viewpoint? 84 Additional categories, including some forms of criminal or tortious speech, can also be equally political and thus raise further problems under Justice Scalia's analysis.
We could thus, in a burst of enthusiasm, think of nearly all speech as First Amendment political speech. But even if we do so, our basic collective and individual values and priorities would not thereby be changed. Many of us, for example, can imagine making great sacrifices for basic political or religious beliefs, perhaps to protect freedom of scientific inquiry or the collective library of civilization itself. The prospect, on the other hand, of fighting and dying on a foreign shore so as to protect minors' access to especially violent and not otherwise seriously 80 . Commercial speech, taken collectively or not, in a sense inherently promotes market-transactional solutions-the exchange of money for goods and services-rather than alternative approaches to even life's deepest problems. See R. GEORGE WRIGHT, SELLING WORDS: FREE SPEECH IN A COMMERCIAL CULTURE 12-77 (1997).
81. See id. 82. As one example, the Court allows for prohibition of commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading, or that proposes an illegal transaction. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64. In contrast, any attempt to prohibit political speech deemed to be, say, deceptive or misleading-the various future costs of a proposed spending program perhaps-would typically be a nonstarter, given the potential for bias and abuse. For a somewhat closer case, see, for example, 281 Care Committee v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 635 (8th Cir. 2011), protecting even knowingly false electoral campaign speech through a strict scrutiny test. See also the Court's willingness to distinguish, in several contexts, between speech that is and is not on a matter of public interest and concern, as referred to infra notes 155- More generally, few of us would be willing to thus fight and die to protect ourselves from typical regulations of what in reality amounts to a minute and readily replaceable fraction of our entertainment or amusement alternatives. 85 Less dramatically, few of us would be willing to trade away some important egalitarian or other civilizational values, as a rigorous strict scrutiny might require, 86 in order to protect the above video game access rights, particularly given all the increasingly broad and accessible remaining entertainment and amusement options. 87 Distinguishing, insofar as possible, political speech from entertainment speech is thus of broad and serious importance.
We have seen in particular that most of the violent video game and related regulations exempt even the most violent such material if, taken as a whole, the material is of serious literary, artistic, scientific, or political value for juveniles. 88 It is difficult to believe that the court would feel any need for this apparent defensiveness and distancing if it also sensed much of a political speech element in the video games in question. But on the basis of precedent, at least, the Swanson court, again with apparent misgivings, applied a stringent strict scrutiny test with a special emphasis on unequivocal proof of causation. Thus, the court concluded that having failed to come forth with incontrovertible proof of a causal relationship between the exposure to such violence and subsequent psychological dysfunction, the State has not satisfied its evidentiary burden. The requirement of such a high level of proof may reflect a refined estrangement from reality, 98 entertainment speech-we naturally consider how broader cultural trends and the "spirit of the age" 104 might have influenced the decision. First, though, we must consider some qualifications.
We have already noticed the daunting complexity of most inquiries into social causation.
105 And even if it were possible to fully explain Justice Scalia's approach in causal terms, that would neither confirm nor invalidate his approach on the merits. 106 Further, any attempt to apply broader cultural themes to a judicial decision must inevitably oversimplify the cultural background. Cultural explanations are more reliable in explaining overall patterns of judicial decisions than any single judicial decision in isolation. And as well, no cultural trend is without its own qualifications, limits, and countertrends. This is all true more specifically of the cultural categories of lateness, decline, and decadence as well as the often conflicting category of barbarism against the background category of civilization. Lateness or decline, for example, will sometimes be accompanied by, linked with, or even intertwined with genuinely progressive and liberating cultural change. Lateness or decadence is to some degree ambiguous and unclear in itself. 107 The idea of lateness may ultimately have no essence-no set of necessary and sufficient conditions. And for every cultural phenomenon we might associate with lateness or decadence, we can find within that culture an apparently contrary trend of one degree or another.
Yet in the end, with all these qualifications, we sometimes find it possible to say, for example, that a sports team, perhaps, or a prominent multigenerational family has entered into a late period of decline. Granting Realistically, there may be little or nothing that objectively suggests lateness or decline in a society; if someone views a society as late, that is often due not to the gradual accumulation of evidence but to a more or less sudden, perhaps subconscious, shift in perspective in which the person now sees much of a wide range of the culture's features as suggesting lateness or decline.
[VOL. 49: 341, 2012] Judicial Line-Drawing SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW the impossibility of uncontroversially pinning down all the particular elements of lateness, we can still survey some of the possible indications thereof. No such listing can be incontestable or complete. No attempt will be made here to defend one list of indicators of lateness over another. Readers are encouraged to add, delete, or reformulate at will and then apply their own formulation. Nor can we here assess the relative importance of any possible indicator of lateness with respect to any other. Instead, the important point is that to the extent that we recognize our broader culture as late-or even in some respects as perhaps bearing marks of barbarism for that matter-the judicial decisionmaking in that culture, at the level of high-profile, open-ended, and controversial judicial decisions, becomes more fully explainable. 108 What then might be some of the phenomena often associated with cultural lateness, particularly those phenomena that might bear, directly or indirectly, consciously or subconsciously, on the approach taken by Justice Scalia in a case like Brown? In no particular order, and again without priority or endorsement, one could list a number of possible lateness indicators: a vague sense that the culture itself has become rather like a tightrope walker with a recently developed excessive self-awareness or a "loss of nerve," resulting in ill-assured steps, lurches, decisional blockage, rigidity, or institutional paralysis followed by indicators such as a loss of genuine collective self-confidence and vitality, despite artificially high levels of cultural narcissism and self-esteem; 109 a fundamentally unserious politics of partisanship, posturing, conscious demagoguery, polarization, 110 animosity, fragmentation, and vehemence at nearly any cost but often based on thin, if not ultimately arbitrary, forms of subjectivism, relativism, 111 skepticism, and other similarly modest foundations; 112 a cultural coarsening and disinhibition of antisocial impulses unrelated to any genuinely progressive aim; an increasing willingness to heavily discount the future despite interest in environmentalism; a redistribution from the future to the present; an increasing sense of a cultural incapacity for sufficient selfcorrection; an increasingly thin understanding of even knowledge-based authority and legitimacy; a widespread indifference to some forms of violence; a culture of the consumption of entertaining experiences, goods, and services of whatever sort; conspicuous self-indulgence as opposed to prudence or reasonable self-restraint; 113 120 not merely of some particular currently dominant cultural assumptions and standards but of many widely shared basic assumptions and progressive aspirations. 121 There may even be, at worst, a vague sense of resistance among the public or political elites to genuine learning and genuine responsibility, at least where such learning would upset strongly held preferences and preconceptions.
Anyone is of course welcome to judge any or all of these tendencies to not be characteristic of either lateness or our culture, to find them biased or trivial, or to substitute additional trends for those listed. But a reasonable case could be made, along the lines classically suggested by Thomas Mann, 122 that at least some of these cultural trends could be reflected in judicial decisionmaking.
One specific way to link broader cultural trends to judicial decisions, in accordance with Mann, would be to assume that some such trends might be subconsciously "absorbed" into judges' understanding of the popular worldview or their intuitive "common sense." More specifically, the above cultural trends might provide much of the defining "frame," 123 or what are called the decisional "anchors" 124 Overall, the category of barbarism doubtless has less to plausibly offer our inquiry than does that of lateness or decline. One could, however, argue that some of the considerations mentioned above, including some trends in acceptance of some forms of violence and in literacy, vocabulary, attention spans, et cetera, could be easily classed as indicators not of lateness but of a mild form of barbarism. To the extent that one views our politics, for example, as increasingly fragmented and uncivil by some-but not all-recent standards or as increasingly Hobbesian, 125 one could characterize those trends as more mildly barbaric than decadent.
"Insensitivity" is a quality that may sometimes bridge the mildly barbaric and the late or decadent. In what respects, then, might Justice Scalia's judgment here indirectly and subconsciously reflect the much broader late spirit of the age? We should, for the sake of fairness, continue to bear in mind that to think of any cultural phenomenon as late is not to thereby prove its defectiveness. As Herbert Marcuse observed years ago, what is denounced as "decay" may actually be liberating and genuinely progressive. 135 Nor should we imagine that all persons, including all federal judges, are equally affected by the lateness of the culture, let alone by all late phenomena. Socrates, for example, held that in a late, decaying democracy, "the old, anxious not to be thought disagreeable tyrants, imitate the young and condescend to enter into their jokes and amusements." 136 As much as a Supreme Court Justice might wish to avoid being unfairly thought a disagreeable tyrant, there may be a narrower limit on the inclination of the Justices to actually enter into the amusements of the young, as distinct from constitutionally validating such amusements.
137
But the decision to strongly constitutionally protect a phenomenon, including violent video games, may in some cases operate to culturally validate the phenomenon in question.
Once the Court leaves the free speech area of classical political argumentation and focuses instead more hazily on vague, nonparticularized "expression," the drawing of First Amendment categorical distinctions may often seem subjective, if not arbitrary. As Daniel Bell once suggested, "[T]he very waywardness of language introduces a larger degree of uncertainty in our . . . theories of knowing. And given this centrality of language as the frame of understanding, for some writers, 'anything goes. '" 138 This uncertainty, especially if it has been increasing in our culture, might not inspire judicial confidence even in traditional verbal distinctions, as between political and entertainment speech. But even without this assumed uneasiness regarding the stability of language, consider how just a few of the possible symptoms of cultural lateness might tend to affect the judicial analysis of entertainment speech and political speech, not merely in the context of violent video games but much more broadly.
Consider, for example, any effect, even indirect and subconscious, of the late cultural phenomenon of a "loss of nerve" or an unnatural selfconsciousness instead of taken-for-granted self-assurance in the judicial wire-walkers of our day. 139 If a judge begins, even subconsciously, with that sense of the culture's uncertainty and uneasiness, consider how an attempt to distinguish politics from entertainment might well seem unrealistic and daunting. Add in, then, a vague sense of cultural fragmentation 140 and perhaps a sense of the relativism, subjectivism, and similar tendencies at work throughout the culture. 141 To those phenomena, add in as well any unavoidable effects of a broad cultural entertainment coarsening, any reduced public confidence in any official claim to genuinely legitimate and fully justified legal or political authority, and the widespread cultural sense that leisure time is largely about consumption of entertaining experiences of whatever quality and is to be generally indulged. 142 And finally, in vaguely Freudian terms, add in the sense, consciously recognized or not, that the broader culture, particularly in the private sphere, has been gradually resetting the balance between the pleasure principle and the reality principle in favor of the former.
143
None of these cultural influences need affect one's approach to politics and entertainment and their respective value as speech at a conscious level. The above trends, if they are indeed real, may be at this point rather like the unseen air we breathe. We may see their influence only in the form of what we take to be common sense or what is realistic, mainstream, familiar, practical, or dangerous.
144 But declining to try to reasonably distinguish, where appropriate, between political and entertainment speech-particularly when that reluctance leads to rigorous, 145 nevertheless eventually involves, as we have suggested, substantial, potentially widespread, and gradually increasing costs.
We need not go so far as to claim, as did the noted cultural critic Neil Postman, that our politics has largely decayed into a form of entertainment. 146 Postman more broadly argued that "[w]hen a population becomes distracted by trivia, when cultural life is redefined as a perpetual round of entertainments, when serious public conversation becomes a form of baby-talk . . . and their public business a vaudeville act, then a nation finds itself at risk; culture-death is a clear possibility." 147 Or alternatively: "Our politics, religion, news, athletics, education and commerce have been transformed into congenial adjuncts of show business, largely without protest or even much popular notice. The result is that we are a people on the verge of amusing ourselves to death." 148 We certainly need not take the argument anywhere near so far. For one thing, the chronic shrillness, demagoguery, animosity, implacability, and increasing polarization of contemporary politics, despite the large stakes, 149 do not feel reducible, for most persons, to any form of entertainment or amusement, even to that of a soccer rivalry or a professional wrestling event. Anyone who senses that his or her ox may be in line for even minimal goring is unlikely to think of politics as mere entertainment.
150
As we have suggested above, though, mere amusement or entertainment speech cannot be merged into the category of political speech as the established case law has typically used the term. 151 If there is nevertheless some other sense in which entertainment speech merges indistinguishably into political speech, by a relativist, late cultural logic, it will inevitably be impossible to long retain meaningful distinctions in constitutional protection between political speech and commercial speech, sexual harassment speech, or even any obscenity that is realistically objected to largely as offensive on the basis of its viewpoint. 152 In particular, applying a rigorous strict scrutiny test to content-based regulations of not just political speech but also most commercial speech, sexual harassment speech, and various forms of obscene materials 153 would not amount to a clear expansion of liberty or an upgrade of a genuinely progressive society. Broadly expanding the use of strict scrutiny in various speech areas would often tend, as the above examples suggest, to reinforce the interests of already culturally dominant groups. It is far from clear why we should be willing to make greater sacrifices on behalf of enhanced free speech protection for commercial marketing, verbal sexual harassment, or various forms of obscenity if there is really no reason for strict scrutiny, including a rigorous causation requirement, in order to regulate such categories of speech on the basis of content.
And once we tire of overprotecting such categories of speech, at substantial costs in various other substantial values, we would then face an awkward choice. We could choose to water down the protection we give to content-based restrictions on political speech, along with the other forms of supposedly indistinguishable speech noted above. Or else, contrary to Justice Scalia's 154 approach in Brown, we could instead decide that after all, reasonably distinguishing between political speech and entertainment speech, in most contexts, is often neither as demanding nor as dangerous as Justice Scalia imagines.
In fact, we do have case precedent for the Supreme Court's quiet reconsideration of an earlier judgment that a similar speech category distinction was too difficult or dangerous to make. The Court, at one point in time, was unwilling to distinguish, in libel cases, between speech on matters of public interest or concern and speech on matters of merely private interest or concern. 155 But some years later, Justice Lewis Powell, the author of the prior opinion, adopted the position that just such a distinction could properly be drawn. 156 In that context, the Court's
